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Developers, the State, and the Politics of Private Property Rights
DONALD LEFFERS*
Cet article utilise une nouvelle approche institutionnaliste pour étudier certains
conflits importants et certains changements de politiques relatifs à l’utilisation des
terres qui ont eu un impact sur les relations de propriété des promoteurs immobiliers.
Les approches institutionnalistes se concentrent sur le rôle d’acteurs, d’idées et de
stratégies clés qui influencent les trajectoires des institutions politiques, et les
manœuvres politiques et stratégiques face aux institutions et aux structures
existantes. En comparant les processus qui ont mené à la promulgation de deux lois
importantes sur l’utilisation des terres régionales – la Loi de 2001 sur la conservation
de la moraine d’Oak Ridges et la Loi de 2005 sur la ceinture de verdure – le présent
article examine le rôle des relations entre les acteurs politiques et les promoteurs
immobiliers, et du climat politique sous-jacent, relativement au développement de
ces lois et à leurs conséquences. L’article démontre que ces deux lois
environnementales sur l’utilisation des terres, qui ont toutes deux des conséquences
importantes sur les droits de propriété privée des propriétaires fonciers, comportent
des différences significatives à la fois relativement à leur développement et à leur
promulgation. L’article révèle aussi que la promulgation de lois provinciales sur
l’utilisation des terres et leurs effets sur les droits de propriété privée font l’objet de
plus importantes négociations et contestations politiques, et produisent des résultats
moins prévisibles que ce qui était auparavant envisagé par le nouvel
institutionnalisme. Cet article se fonde sur des études de cas pour illustrer les
différentes façons dont les promoteurs immobiliers et les décideurs gouvernementaux
clés exercent leur pouvoir, en travaillant à l’intérieur des structures juridiques
existantes et contre celles-ci, pour faire avancer des agendas particuliers d’utilisation
de l’espace urbain.
This article uses a new institutionalist approach to investigate major land use conflicts
and regional land use policy changes in the Toronto region that affected the property
relations of land developers. Institutionalist approaches focus on the role of key actors,
ideas, and strategies in influencing the trajectories of political institutions, and the
confrontation of political and strategic maneuvering in the face of existing institutions
and structures. Through comparison of the processes driving enactment of two major
regional land use statutes—the Oak Ridge Moraine Conservation Act and the Greenbelt
Act—this article pays close attention to the relationships between political actors and
land developers, as well as the underlying political climate in shaping the development
and outcomes of these statutes. This article shows that these two environmental land use
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statutes, which both had significant implications for the private property rights of land
owners, differed in important ways in both their development and enactment. This article
also shows that the enactment of provincial land use laws and their effects on private
property rights are subject to greater political negotiation and contestation, and more
unpredictable outcomes, than previously considered within new institutionalism. This
article draws on case study research to illuminate the varied ways that land developers
and key governmental decision makers exercise power, working within and against
existing legal structures to forward particular agendas vis-à-vis urban land use.

THIS ARTICLE INVESTIGATES ENVIRONMENTALLY BASED LAND USE CONFLICTS and policy
changes in the Toronto region to examine the relationships among the state, land developers, and
private property rights. 1 It compares two related Toronto region environmental conservation
statutes, the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Act, 2001 2 and the Greenbelt Act, 20053, paying
particular attention to the role of government agendas and land developers’ property interest
claims in shaping the parameters and functions of these statutes. Although differing in detail,
both statutes represent attempts to reconcile tensions between land extensive urban development
(i.e., sprawl) and preservation of the “countryside,” broadly defined. The Oak Ridges Moraine
Conservation Act was passed 13 December 2001 under the provincial Ontario Progressive
Conservative government led by then Premier Mike Harris.4 The Progressive Conservatives were
defeated in 2003 by the Liberals led by Dalton McGuinty, who took office 23 October 2003.
Under the McGuinty government, the Greenbelt Act was passed 28 February 2005.5 A central
issue underpinning this investigation of the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Act and the
Greenbelt Act is the notion that although these environmental statutes have some similarities,
they involved and affected land developers very differently. The purpose of this article is to
critically examine the varied ways that land developers attempt to influence the formulation and

1

By property law I am referring to property law in land (real property) or what is sometimes termed “land law;”
e.g., Kevin Gray & Susan F Gray, Land Law, 7th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) [Gray & Gray, Land
Law]. Denise Johnson suggests American property law comes from common law, statutes, and the Constitution.
Denise Johnson, “Reflections on the Bundle of Rights” (2007) 32:2 Vt L Rev 247 at 248. While this might also
broadly describe property law in Canadian common law jurisdictions, matters of organization, jurisdiction, and
governance frameworks are also important. For example, in Canada, under the constitutional regime of federalism,
the regulation of privately owned land is primarily a provincial responsibility, although the administration of land
use is mainly municipal. David Pond, “Institutions, Political Economy and Land-use Policy: Greenbelt Politics in
Ontario” (2009) 18:2 Environmental Politics 238 at 239 [Pond, “Greenbelt Politics”]. The provincially delegated
authority of municipal councils to enact zoning and other by-laws is the primary tool through which private land use
is regulated in Canadian cities, and the legal land use framework protects owners of private property insofar as it
includes rules for fair, transparent, and predictable municipal planning procedures, such as zoning by-law changes
and the processing of development applications. Ian Rogers & Alison Butler, Canadian Law of Planning and
Zoning, 2nd ed (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2005) [Rogers & Butler]. Provincial quasi-judicial tribunals also play
a role in enacting property law in Canada. In Ontario, the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) adjudicates land use
disputes. Environment and Land Tribunals Ontario, The Ontario Municipal Board (Toronto: ELTO, 2015), online:
<elto.gov.on.ca> [perma.cc/WHK4-Y5HU].
2
Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Act, 2001, SO 2001, c 31 [Conservation Act].
3
Greenbelt Act, 2005, SO 2005, c 1 [Greenbelt Act].
4
Conservation Act, supra note 2.
5
Greenbelt Act, supra note 3.
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effects of land use legislation, and the political maneuvering developers and policy makers
navigate as they attempt to exercise power to serve their own interests and agendas.
With a view to more explicitly foregrounding legal structures and practices and property
rights claims within urban and planning scholarship, this article pays close attention to the ways
that state actors and agencies confront and mobilize specific legal tools to navigate often
competing agendas of environmental protection and economic growth. Broadly informed by new
institutionalism,6 I illuminate different forms of state power to regulate land use, as well as the
power of land developers to assert their claims to private property rights. I draw on this approach
to highlight how political actors, working within institutional boundaries, can shape the legal
geographies of land use and property rights for particular purposes. Certain strands of
institutionalism, most notably “third-phase institutionalism,” place particular emphasis on how
strategic political agencies and actors mobilize to navigate opportunities and constraints to
institutional change.7 Historical institutionalism, on the other hand, attempts to account for and
theorize institutional stability and change. 8 Within the existing historical institutionalism
literature, the rights of private property holders often appear to be stable, functioning to protect
the expectations of owners. 9 Yet in practice, the strategic regulation of land use, especially
during periods of crisis, means that these rights are far from stable, and the changes both gradual
and dramatic. 10 Drawing on new institutionalism, notably third-phase and historical
institutionalism, this article contributes to a growing literature in urban geography, planning, and
socio-legal studies that critically examines the complex workings of property and property law.11
This article advances scholarship on new institutionalism by extending its application to
understanding the complexities of land use planning and disputes. By highlighting different
outcomes from two land use disputes, this article also critiques overly structuralist tendencies
within some historical institutionalist analyses, which have at times downplayed the role of
power, politics, and conflict in triggering changes in the land use planning “system.” At the same
time, this article, by employing an institutional approach, enhances understanding of urban
planning, and socio-legal theory and conflict, especially by emphasizing the often unpredictable
factors at play in the creation and resolution of land use conflict, and the often discounted role of
key actors and ideas in shaping the outcomes of planning decisions. This article provides an
example of what David Pond refers to as government “activism” regarding land use regulation,12
6

Vivien Lowndes & Mark Roberts, Why Institutions Matter: The New Institutionalism in Political Science
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) at 116, 117 [Lowndes & Roberts]; Jan Olsson,
Subversion in Institutional Change and Stability: A Neglected Mechanism (London: Palgrave, 2015) at 23, 24
[Olsson].
7
Olsson, supra note 6 at 24.
8
E.g. see generally Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen & Frank Longstreth, Structuring Politics: Historical
Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
9
John A Lovett, “Property and Radically Changed Circumstances” (2007) 74:4 Tenn L Rev 463 at 466.
10
André Sorensen, “Evolving Property Rights in Japan: Patterns and Logics of Change” (2011) 48:3 Urban Studies
471 at 472 [Sorensen]; see, generally, José María Tubío-Sánchez, et al “Institutional Change in Land Planning: Two
Cases from Galicia” (2013) 21:8 European Planning Studies 1276.
11
See, for example, Nicholas Blomley, Unsettling the City: Urban Land and the Politics of Property (New York:
Routledge, 2004) [Blomley]; Eric Freyfogle, “Property and Liberty” (2010) 34:1 Harv Envtl Law Rev 75
[Freyfogle]; Donald Krueckeberg, “The Difficult Character of Property: To Whom Do Things Belong?” (1995) 61:3
Journal of the American Planning Association 301 [Krueckeberg].
12
Pond, “Greenbelt Politics,” supra note 1 at 244.
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and gives case study details to what Marcia Valiante and Anneke Smit describe as the “wide
latitude” that planning authorities have to make decisions that affect private property rights in
Canada.13
This article proceeds as follows. Section I outlines connections in planning and legal
scholarship to urban land use and regulation. This section also introduces theories of new
institutionalism—the theoretical framework underpinning this article—suggesting ways that new
institutionalism can contribute to addressing gaps in planning and socio-legal scholarship. I then
proceed to explain the case study research, which is part of a broader research project conducted
between 2011 and 2013. Over this two-year period I conducted thirty interviews with suburban
developers, planners, environmental activists, and politicians in order to explore the relationship
between land developers and the land use planning and regulatory system in the Toronto region.
I also conducted extensive document analysis, including that of provincial government debates
and legislation, and coverage of these debates in local newspapers, especially the Toronto Star
and Globe and Mail. In the final section, I compare the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Act,
2001 and the Greenbelt Act, 2005, showing that these two pieces of environmental land use
legislation differed in important ways in both their development and enactment.14 By way of
conclusion I offer a number of ways that an institutional approach contributes to an
understanding of legal processes governing land use. Institutionalist approaches focus on the role
of key actors, ideas, and strategies in influencing the trajectories of land based property disputes,
and the confrontation of political and strategic maneuvering in the face of existing institutions
and structures.

I. PROPERTY AND THE LAW IN URBAN AND PLANNING
SCHOLARSHIP
Scholarship on the role of property and the law in land use planning and regulation is growing,
albeit slowly. Writing in the early 1990s, Donald Krueckeberg suggested that planning is not
simply about “land use,” a seemingly objective process of categorizing and sorting activities
according to their “proper” spatial location. 15 Rather, Krueckeberg argued, planning is more
accurately about property: a much richer concept that involves competing values of land and land
use activities, competing views of the role of the state in the “intervention” in private property,
and an explicit recognition that land use decisions are moral and contested, rather than rational
and objective. Despite this statement of the central importance of property in planning, Amanda
Davies and Mark Atkinson lament that planning theory has given property no more than cursory
attention, Harvey Jacobs and Kurt Paulsen refer to property rights as a “neglected theme” in
American planning scholarship, and Marcia Valiante and Anneke Smit suggest the Canadian
planning literature has given little attention to the role of private property rights in the regulation
13

Marcia Valiante & Anneke Smit, “Introduction” in Anneke Smit & Marcia Valiante, eds, Public Interest, Private
Property: Law and Planning Policy in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015) at 13 [Valiante & Smit]. They argue
that this is the result of the general refusal of Canadian courts to include protection of private property rights as a
Charter right. See also Ronit Levine-Schnur, “Revitalizing Land Use Law: Introductory Notes” (2017) this issue, for
a discussion of a virtual absence of substantial judicial review of municipal land use law in Canada.
14
Conservation Act, supra note 2; Greenbelt Act, supra note 3.
15
Krueckeberg, supra note 11 at 301.
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of urban space. 16 There are many notable exceptions to this neglect of property in planning
scholarship, especially outside of the North American context. For example, work on planning
and property in the Netherlands has investigated the role of state ownership of land in controlling
private speculation.17 Carrying out research on gated communities in China and England, Sarah
Blandy and Feng Wang illustrate the intersections of law and power, showing that neoliberal
schemes of partnership between developers and local political actors can serve to bypass existing
land use policies, although the exact mechanisms of how these policies are bypassed are not
discussed. 18 Bhuvaneswari Raman investigates the use of planning tools in the granting of
property rights to squatters in Delhi, India, as a neoliberal state project of poverty reduction.19
These studies show that rules around private property, land use regulation, and land use planning
intersect in complex ways, are often politicized and influenced by exercises of power, and have
immediate implications for urban development.
Although rarely writing explicitly about land use regulation and planning,20 socio-legal
scholars and legal geographers have had much to say about property, property rights, and land.21
Common planning issues, such as urban sprawl, intensification, and redevelopment confront
normative and moral evaluations of how land should be used and what responsibilities owners
should assume. 22 The moral dimensions of property have been shown to pervade ideas of
property rights, especially during conflicts over proposals for land use change. 23 As Damien
Collins states, while property rights “can be articulated in absolutist terms, their enactment has
always depended upon broad social and legal acceptance.” 24 Property rights have social and
legal dimensions, the former of which are often articulated forcefully during land use disputes.
16

Amanda Davies & Mark Atkinson, “The Moderating Influence of Property Legislation on Planning Policy and
Urban Form” (2012) 49:16 Urban Studies 3479 at 3480; Harvey Jacobs & Kurt Paulsen, “Property Rights: The
Neglected Theme of 20th-Century American Planning” (2009) 75:2 Journal of the American Planning Association
134; Valiante & Smit, supra note 13 at 2.
17
Edwin Buitelaar & Arno Segeren, “Urban Structures and Land. The Morphological Effects of Dealing With
Property Rights” (2011) 26:5 Housing Studies 661; Ary Samsura, Erwin van der Krabben & AMA van Deemen, “A
Game Theory Approach to the Analysis of Land and Property Development Processes” (2010) 27:2 Land Use
Policy 564; Terry Van Dijk & Arno van der Vlist, “On the Interaction Between Landownership and Regional
Designs for Land Development” (2015) 52:10 Urban Studies 1899.
18
Sarah Blandy & Feng Wang, “Curbing the Power of Developers? Law and Power in Chinese and English Gated
Urban Enclaves” (2013) 47 Geoforum 199.
19
Bhuvaneswari Raman, “The Politics of Property in Land: New Planning Instruments, Law and Popular Groups in
Delhi” (2015) 10:3 Journal of South Asian Development 369 [Raman].
20
For example, reviews of the socio-legal scholarship in legal geography and critical legal studies, although
ostensibly focused on space, place, and landscape, mention little about the role of the law in urban planning,
although there is some attention given to ‘municipal law;’ e.g., Luke Bennett & Antonia Layard, “Legal Geography:
Becoming Spatial Detectives” (2015) 9:7 Geography Compass 406; Chris Butler, “Critical Legal Studies and the
Politics of Space” (2009) 18:3 Soc & Leg Stud 313; David Delaney, “Legal Geography I: Constitutivities,
Complexities, and Contingencies” (2015) 39: 1 Progress in Human Geography 96; David Delaney, “Legal
Geography II: Discerning Injustice” (2016) 40:2 Progress in Human Geography 267.
21
Katrina Myrvang Brown, “Understanding the Materialities and Moralities of Property: Reworking Collective
Claims to Land” (2009) 32:4 Trans Inst Br Geogr 507; Blomley, supra note 11, Freyfogle, supra note 11.
22
Damian Collins, “Contesting Property Development in Coastal New Zealand: A Case Study of Ocean Beach,
Hawke’s Bay” (2009) 33:1 International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 147 at 149 [Collins].
23
Blomley, supra note 11, especially chapter 3.
24
Collins, supra note 22 at 149.
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Even though private property regimes require governmental regulation to function,25 owners of
real property often deploy morally based assertions of private property rights to argue against
environmental policies that restrict their own land use. 26 Moral assertions of this variety
prioritize individual economic growth opportunities, and unless environmental protection can be
framed in terms of resource protection, broad political support by landowners is unlikely. 27
Moral assertions are far from benign, as majority support for particular claims can lead to
legislatures enacting new laws.28 A moral dilemma facing land use regulators’ statutory power to
enact regulatory measures stems from the questions of who pays for (broadly understood), and
who benefits from, regulations.29 Greenbelts or other urban boundary constraints, for example,
might serve to increase the value and potential profits from land in the aggregate by removing
supply,30 but for owners whose land has been removed from the market, the costs of greenbelt
legislation are very high.
Recent urban scholarship has drawn on different strands of “new institutionalism” to
investigate with more nuance the governance of urban development and land use. New
institutionalists generally argue that history and formal rules matter in government and
governance, but local cultures, informal practices, and ideas can also shape, in important ways,
how policies are developed and practiced. 31 Drawing on the “interpretive institutionalism” of
Marc Bevir and Rod Rhodes, geographers David Gibbs and Rob Krueger analyze smart growth
in the Boston city-region, arguing that the governance of city-regional land use is shaped by a
combination of historically inherited rules, as well as ever-evolving “traditions” and “beliefs” of
political actors in land use planning and governance institutions. 32 Drawing more on a
structuralist form of historical institutionalism, Andre Sorensen and Paul Hess explain the
Toronto region suburban development pattern as the effect of rules and systems (especially
around infrastructure provision) put in place in the post-World War II period.33 Implicit in this
framing is the power of initial decisions, the path dependency of decisions that follow, and the
stability of resulting systems. Absent in this framework are actors, politics, or specific
mechanisms through which land use planning and governance are carried out. While Sorensen
25

Carol Rose, “Liberty, Property, Environmentalism” (2009) 26:2 Social Philosophy & Policy 1 at 11 [Rose,
“Liberty”]. In terms of land use, at the most basic level limitations on one individual landowner's property rights are
necessary insofar as they protect the rights of others, including other landowners and the broader ‘public interest’
now and in the future. Laura Underkuffler, The Idea of Property: Its Meaning and Power (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003) at 96 [Underkuffler]; Freyfogle, supra note 11 at 83.
26
Collins, supra note 22 at 149.
27
See generally, Rose, “Liberty,” supra note 25.
28
Freyfogle, supra note 11 at 83.
29
Kevin Gray & Susan Gray, “The Idea of Property in Land” in Susan Bright & John Dewar, eds, Land Law:
Themes and Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) at 24 [Gray & Gray, “Idea of Property”]
30
Amal K Ali “Greenbelts to Contain Urban Growth in Ontario, Canada: Promises and Prospects” (2008) 23:4
Planning, Practice & Research 533 at 536; Yvonne Rydin, Housing Land Policy (London: Ashgate, 1986) at 31.
31
See generally, Vivien Lowndes, “Rescuing Aunt Sally: Taking Institutional Theory Seriously in Urban Politics”
(2001) 38:11 Urban Studies 1953.
32
David Gibbs & Rob Krueger, “Fractures in Meta-Narratives of Development: An Interpretive Institutionalist
Account of Land Use Development in the Boston City-Region” (2012) 36:2 Int J Urban and Reg 363 at 376; Mark
Bevir & Rod Rhodes, The State as Cultural Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
33
André Sorensen & Paul Hess, “Building Suburbs, Toronto-Style: Land Development Regimes, Institutions,
Critical Junctures and Path Dependence” (2015) 86:4 Town Planning Review 411 at 412 [Sorensen & Hess].
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and Hess describe in detail the “architecture” of the rules and institutions controlling land
development in the Toronto region, they emphasize the power of planners and the planning
system. There is no attention paid to the politics that fuel institutional development and change,
and little regard for the role of elite actors, such as land developers, in influencing the negotiation
and application of planning and legal institutions. Both historical and interpretive institutionalism
are much better at explaining institutional stability than change,34 and the emphasis on the effects
of “stable” planning and governance institutions in planning scholarship reflects this theoretical
tendency. Perhaps that is why land use and property law are not much considered in these
literatures—they are assumed to be objective, stable, and apolitical. On the other hand,
economists and legal scholars have long surmised that property rights and the law are politically
negotiated and constructed, and “evolve” over time. 35 But it is not simply the evolution of
property rights and property law that is of interest here; rather, I am interested in the underlying
characteristics and conditions at play that allow for this evolution.
Theoretically, I draw on new institutionalism, specifically third-phase institutionalism,
which itself owes much to historical institutionalism, in order to more fully explain the politics of
private property rights in shaping the outcomes of land use planning, development, and
conflict.36 Lowndes and Roberts conceptualize third-phase institutionalism as a consolidation of
several strands of new institutionalism, including historical, rational choice, sociological, and
discursive institutionalism. Although differing in emphasis in the importance of structural forces
versus individual agency, these forms of new institutionalism seek to explain the workings of
political life, and historical institutionalism privileges processes of institutional stability and
change.37 Third-phase institutionalism places particular emphasis on strategic political agency,
especially as a key factor in institutional change. 38 Political agency can be described in this
context as “combative acts,” where political actors consider their actions within the constraints of
acceptable rules and norms, strategically evaluating which rules can be subverted and how power
can be mobilized to achieve particular ends.39 Constraints and prevailing rules can be actively,
albeit often covertly, resisted. In this context, land use and private property rights, as well as the
“planning system” with its well-defined procedures, can be considered institutions 40 –sets of
formal and informal rules that enable, constrain, or shape in some way social interactions and
outcomes.41 In this sense, private property rights, as Demetrio Muñoz-Gielen states, are a type of

34

See, generally Guy B Peters, Institutional Theory in Political Science: The New Institutionalism, 3rd ed (New
York: Continuum, 2012); Vivien Schmidt, “Taking Ideas and Discourse Seriously: Explaining Change Through
Discursive Institutionalism as the Fourth ‘New Institutionalism’” (2010) 2 European Political Science Review 1.
35
E.g., Terry P Anderson & PJ Hill, “The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West” (1975)
18:1 JL & Econ 163; Oona A Hathaway, “Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in
a Common Law System” (2001) 86 Iowa L Rev 601.
36
Lowndes & Roberts, supra note 6; Olsson, supra note 6.
37
Olsson, supra note 6.
38
Olsson, supra note 6 at 26.
39
Ibid.
40
John Brigham, Property and the Politics of Entitlement (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990) [Brigham].
41
Timothy C Lim, Doing Comparative Politics: An Introduction to Approaches and Issues, 2nd ed (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 2010) [Lim].
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formal rule that can “decisively influence power relations between public and private actors.”42
The institution of private property, in a new institutionalist framework, is not simply a rational
system for maximizing individual preferences, nor is it simply the product of larger political,
social, or economic systems. Private property rights are continuously claimed and contested in a
complex institutional setting that has the potential to change in various ways for different
reasons.43 Analyzing the outcomes of property disputes, then, becomes a matter of investigating
the particular events, actors, and ideas that shaped the disputes. In my case study, for example, I
show that electoral politics and pre-existing state-corporate relationships were important factors
shaping land use legislation that affected existing private property rights. Examining how
political elements shape private property interests requires close attention to governance cultures
and context-specific strategies to understand how land use policies are developed and enacted in
practice. Furthermore, I show how specific decisions about property not only have material and
geographical consequences, but also how specific places and actors influence property decisions
in particular ways. These decisions are shaped in tangible ways by local politics and actors,
leading to highly place-based material consequences.
Changes in land use legislation are often politically charged, as they can directly impact
owners of private property. Christopher Rodgers notes that private property rights can shift in
practice when, for example, authorities enact new laws that change the property rights of
owners.44 Land use legislation, as Carol Rose notes, is often rationalized based on the “public
interest,” which can have multiple meanings based on particular spatial and temporal contexts.45
What constitutes the public interest, and therefore the parameters of state regulation of land use,
is a matter of history, framing, contestation, ideology, strategy, and so on. Laura Underkuffler
notes that the values underlying property claims can be spatially and temporally fluid. 46 As
Raman notes, “property rights and relations are continuously being reconfigured out of contests
over meaning, boundaries and the mutual constitution of property and social relations, including
state-citizen relationships. The state, by virtue of its role as a guarantor of property, plays a key
role in defining, establishing and enforcing property boundaries.”47 But state actors and agencies
act strategically to navigate the rules and external pressures to manage conflict and achieve
political goals, such as economic development or environmental protection. In other words, how
and under what conditions political actors influence “property rights and relations,” to use
Raman’s phrasing, is an important question for empirical investigation. The next section turns to
a case study in the Toronto region, highlighting the complexity of planning, property rights, and
land use law as tools ostensibly mobilized to protect the environment, and the power of
developers to shape the content and use of these tools.
42

Demetrio Muñoz-Gielen, “Urban Governance, Property Rights, Land Readjustment and Public Value Capturing”
(2012) 21:1 European Urban and Regional Studies 60 at 61.
43
Sorensen, supra note 10 at 480. Sorensen lists court decisions, citizen activism, and elections as some of the forces
triggering institutional change, although he notes change is often slow, taking the form of two steps forward and one
step back.
44
Christopher Rodgers, “Nature’s Place? Property Rights, Property Rules and Environmental Stewardship” (2009)
68:3 Cambridge LJ 550 at 564 [Rodgers].
45
Carol Rose, “Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law” (2000) 1 Utah L Rev 1 at 1
[Rose, “Property and Expropriation”]
46
Underkuffler, supra note 25 at 93.
47
Raman, supra note 19 at 389.
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II. REGULATING PROPERTY IN THE TORONTO REGION
The Oak Ridges Moraine (ORM), located north of Toronto, Canada's largest city, is an
approximately 160 km long east-west trending geological landscape formed through glacial till
deposition (Figure 1).48 The ORM consists of complex layers of bedrock, sand, gravel, and other
glacial deposits; lakes and marshes drain into these layers, and several aquifers of varying depths
feed a network of rivers and streams with a continuous flow of groundwater. 49 The ORM,
especially since the mid-1990s, has become framed as a sensitive landscape based on its ability
to store and filter groundwater.50 But as part of it is within Canada's largest urban region, the
ORM has also been the site of intense development pressure, and suburban developers have
come to see it as an ideal location to house an ever-expanding population. This section outlines
the history of this development pressure and the land conflict it triggered when development was
resisted by environmental and homeowner groups, as well as by some municipal councils and
planning authorities. It then documents the provincial government’s response to the conflict. In
doing so, this section delves into specific negotiations the provincial government undertook with
key developers on the Oak Ridges Moraine and suggests the rationale for and implications of
these special negotiations.
During the late 1990s and early 2000s developers had been putting pressure on municipal
planning departments on the ORM to approve their plans to build thousands of houses on the
moraine; environmentalists, anti-sprawl activists, and homeowner groups opposed these
development plans by challenging sprawl and by proposing stringent limits on development to
preserve natural areas.51 While some local municipalities on the ORM, as well as the provincial
Government, undertook efforts in the 1990s to protect the ORM,52 these efforts were resisted by
developers, who claimed that the protection of environmental features on private lands amounted
to “expropriation without compensation.”53
48
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Figure 1. The Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Plan Area in southern Ontario.54
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2002), online: <mah.gov.on.ca/Page1738.aspx> [perma.cc/RDZ7-DHTEN].
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While claims of expropriation without compensation are perhaps to be expected when
landowners are faced with government regulations affecting what owners plan to do with their
land, these claims often have little legal basis. Private property rights are not protected under the
Canadian constitution. Section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 grants provincial legislatures the
authority to make laws in relation to property.55 The Canadian Bill of Rights does indeed protect
“enjoyment of property,” but only to the extent that one cannot be deprived of this right except in
accordance with “due process of law;” it does not protect abstract property rights in land.56 With
the legal absence of protection of property rights at the federal level, coupled with numerous
statutory and common law limitations on property rights (e.g., environmental and nuisance laws),
provincial and federal governments have considerable ability to appropriate so-called
“development rights” without having to compensate landowners, as long as legislation serves a
justifiable public purpose.57 According to Justice Cromwell in Mariner Real Estate Ltd. v Nova
Scotia, “de facto expropriations are very rare in Canada and they require proof of virtual
extinction of an identifiable interest in land.”58 Cases that have resulted in compensation from
statutes affecting zoning are rare in Canada; a key criterion is that the value of land has been
nearly diminished entirely.59 At no time was this degree of devaluation applicable to proposed
regulation of development on the ORM. Yet, as discussed below, developers claims of private
property rights often ‘haunted’ the process of imagining and devising conservation legislation on
the ORM,60 often through threats of lawsuits and claims of unfairness.61
The contest between developers advocating for their property right and their opponents
arguing for environmental protection 62 reached new heights in the early 2000s, such that the
Conservative provincial government, led by Premier Mike Harris, began to develop legislation to
limit urban development in parts of the ORM.63 Even though the Harris government was, as
Roger Keil describes, “uncompromisingly neoliberal” and ideologically opposed to government
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“interference” in business, 64 in order to maintain public support, the Harris government
responded to development opposition and passed conservation legislation, the Oak Ridges
Moraine Protection Act,65 on 17 May 2001. This interim legislation prevented developers from
submitting new development applications to municipal planning departments on the ORM for a
period of six months, after which new legislation and a conservation plan would be put in place.
Specifically, the Oak Ridges Moraine Protection Act prevented municipalities from enacting new
by-laws, approving official plans or official plan amendments, and approving draft or final plans
of subdivisions within the Oak Ridges Moraine Plan Area (Figure 1),66 and precluded individual
applicants from applying for those same things. 67 The legislation was in effect a significant
limitation on private property rights, as existing procedural law outlined in the Planning Act68
and that dictated the municipal processing of development applications was essentially put on
hold. The Planning Act specifies procedures and timeframes for proposed zoning changes, plans
of subdivision, land severances, and amendments to official plans, and also the procedures and
timeframes for appealing municipal decisions to the Ontario Municipal Board. All of these
procedures were put on hold through the Oak Ridges Moraine Protection Act.
During the six-month period established by the Oak Ridges Moraine Protection Act, the
Conservative government led public and stakeholder consultations to devise guidelines for the
permanent protection of the ORM. It also struck the thirteen member Oak Ridges Moraine
Advisory Panel (ORMAP) that included three ORM land developers, as well as representatives
from environmental organizations, different levels of government, agriculture and aggregate
industries, and academia; the role of the ORMAP was to develop and formulate
recommendations for ORM protection that the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Chris
Hodgson, could then use to develop legislation and a Plan for the ORM. 69 The main
recommendation of the ORMAP was to create four land use designations on the ORM that
specified permitted land uses, the intent being to protect the most environmentally sensitive areas
while still permitting development in existing urbanized areas.70
Hodgson attempted to address the interests of developers during the formulation of ORM
legislation and Plan. As such, Hodgson made deals with four ORM developers (including the
three on the ORMAP) to exchange certain developer-owned land on the ORM with provinciallyowned lands in an adjacent municipality, Pickering, Ontario (Figure 2).71 This land exchange
became known as the “Seaton Land Exchange” because the land the developers received in
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Pickering had long been planned for development of a city called Seaton. 72 As is further
elaborated below, as part of the deal, Hodgson also used a minister's zoning order73 to permit the
developers to build 6,600 housing units on approximately 375 hectares of land within the ORM,
which would become the subdivisions “Macleod’s Landing” and “Bond Lake Village” in
Richmond Hill, a town on the ORM north of Toronto.74 This, as well as the land exchange,
allowed Hodgson to garner developer support for protection of the rest of the ORM.
A land exchange had long been suggested by the environmental group, Save the Oak
Ridges Moraine (STORM), as one way to remove development interests from the moraine.75 Of
the four developers involved in the Seaton land exchange, three owned land in Richmond Hill
and one owned land in Uxbridge, a township north of Pickering, and all had active development
applications that were put on hold by the Oak Ridges Moraine Protection Act. The Richmond
Hill development applications were very contentious, triggered massive citizen mobilization
contesting the proposals, and resulted in failure on the part of Richmond Hill city council to
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Figure 2. Seaton land exchange. Land developers exchanged Richmond Hill and Uxbridge lands
for provincially owned land in Seaton, Pickering.76
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Figure adapted from MMAH, Land Exchange, supra note 71 at Appendix A(9).
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make a decision on the applications. 77 As a result, these developers were part of group of
Richmond Hill landowners that had appealed their development applications to the Ontario
Municipal Board (OMB), the quasi-judicial appeals tribunal charged with resolving land use
planning disputes in Ontario.78 The OMB had not yet made a decision when the Oak Ridges
Moraine Protection Act was passed in May 2001.
After the six-month period following passage of the Oak Ridges Moraine Protection Act,
the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Act, 2001, 79 was passed in the provincial legislature,
which put significant limits on land development on the ORM and which gave the Minister of
Municipal Affairs and Housing the authority to establish the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation
Plan.80 The Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Act included “transitional provisions” that were
applicable to “all applications, matters or proceedings commenced on or after November 17,
2001”81 (given the six-month moratorium on development authorized by Oak Ridges Moraine
Protection Act, the applicable date was actually 17 May 2001). The transitional clause stated that
any planning decisions made by planning authorities prior to 17 November 2001 (actually 17
May 2001) were permitted to proceed; applications where decisions had not been rendered,
including by the OMB, were required to “conform to the prescribed provisions of the Oak Ridges
Moraine Conservation Plan as if the Plan were in force on or before the date the application,
matter or proceeding was commenced.”82 The applications made by the developers involved in
the Seaton land exchange had yet to be approved, and without a special deal would have been
subject to the new provisions. As Rodgers notes, new legislation has the potential to shift the
prevailing property rights of owners,83 in this case by eliminating the right of landowners to
apply to have the zoning of their land changed from rural to urban. This is one way that private
property rights can be construed as political—subject to land use conflict and a state legislative
response, such as new environmental regulations.84 While conservation legislation did not alter
the ownership of land for ORM landowners in terms of title, it shifted the suite of property rights
that they previously enjoyed, including the right to develop their land if granted permission to do
so by local municipal planning authorities. For the land exchange developers, however, property
rights took on a very different form, as is explained below.
In contrast to limiting the use of private property through new provincial legislation that
defined how land would be zoned, the Seaton land exchange was in effect an expropriation with
compensation, where developers were compensated for loss of their so-called “development
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rights” on ORM lands by the granting of lands of similar value off the ORM.85 While a clear
rationale for the land exchange has never been offered by the province, it likely has to do with
the exceptional nature of both the land itself and of the political context. The Richmond Hill
lands in particular were deemed by environmental activists and provincial government agencies,
drawing on conservation biology principles, to be of ecological significant and in need of
protection. 86 Furthermore, as an example of what Sandberg and Wekerle refer to as “rural
gentrification,” wealthy exurban homeowners’ groups opposed development in Richmond Hill,
as they feared development would jeopardize the amenity value of an exclusive and scenic
landscape.87 The ORM land use conflicts seemed to take on what Frederic Deng describes as a
prototypical controversy in land use change that creates a dilemma for land use regulators: “the
problems of NIMBY (not in my back yard) and ‘regulatory takings’.” 88 In other words,
opponents to development demand increased land use regulation to protect a valuable resource,
while proponents argue that increased land use regulation is an affront to private property rights.
These development proposals became very politicized, and were likely the catalyst for provincial
government action to protect the ORM. The result is that four developers were able to escape the
full impact of the legislation that changed the private property rights of all other ORM
landowners. Through the land exchange, these developers were also able to have their property
rights shifted from one site, the ORM in Richmond Hill, to another, Seaton in Pickering. While a
contested idea (e.g., see Sarah Hamill, this volume89), to some property and socio-legal theorists,
property is not a thing, but a social relationship with respect to things. 90 In this case, the
relationship between developers and the state proved to be crucial. The “thing” was not really
even land, at least particular parcels of land. It was the right, given by a planning authority, to
profit from the transformation of a land from one land use category (rural) to another (urban).91 It
was the ability to escape a provincial level policy limiting the use of land. No other ORM
landowners were provided a way to escape this legislation that significantly impacted the use of
private property.
As mentioned above, some of the Seaton land exchange developers profited from
exceptions to the ORM legislation in another way: through a zoning order Minister Hodgson
used in 2001 granting developers permission to build 6,600 housing units on the ORM in
85
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Richmond Hill.92 Section 47 of the Planning Act, 1990 gives the Minister of Municipal Affairs
and Housing the authority to rezone, without public notice or hearing, any property in Ontario.93
Zoning orders are rarely used in jurisdictions with existing planning authorities and zoning bylaws.94 Yet zoning orders represent a latent form of authority that can be used at the discretion of
the ruling government, even in jurisdictions with existing planning authority and official plans.
The minister's zoning order is a powerful tool that although rare, renders legal zoning categories
subject to change at the determination of the provincial government. They are usually justified
with reference to public or provincial “interests,” but as Carol Rose notes, terms such as
“interest” have multiple meanings.95 In the case of the ORM, the Harris government had many
interests, including popular support and conflict resolution. A minister's zoning order is therefore
a tangible way that various political interests can be transformed into specific rules affecting
property rights.
When the Harris government96 granted some ORM developers permission to build 6,600
housing units on the ORM through a zoning order and minutes of settlement, the opposition
Liberal party strongly opposed this deal. In late 2003 the Liberal government, under the
leadership of Dalton McGuinty, won the provincial election, promising, as part of the election
campaign, to cancel the deal and halt all new housing construction on the ORM. Once elected,
however, McGuinty backtracked on this promise, citing legal agreements that had been made
between the Conservatives and the developers prior to the election. In the fall of 2003, McGuinty
fulfilled election promises to begin developing a massive greenbelt of protected agricultural and
environmental lands (Figure 3). Greenbelt legislation was enacted 24 February 2005 through the
Greenbelt Act, 2005.97 The Greenbelt Act authorized the Greenbelt Plan, which specified land
uses for the greenbelt.98 The Greenbelt Plan incorporates the existing regional plans, the Niagara
Escarpment Plan, and the Oak Ridges Moraine Plan, and includes a new category called the
“Protected Countryside.”99 The Protected Countryside includes three main categories of land use
with differing policies: the Agricultural System, the Natural System, and Settlement Areas.100
Only in settlement areas, which are defined by existing municipal boundaries of towns, villages,
and hamlets, is urban development permitted (within the guidelines of existing municipal official
101
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Figure 3. The Greenbelt Plan Area in southern Ontario.102
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Stakeholder and public consultation processes used to formulate greenbelt legislation in
some ways mirrored the ORM process. In February 2004, the Minister of Municipal Affairs and
Housing, John Gerretsen, appointed a stakeholder advisory body, the “Greenbelt Task Force” to
develop principles and lead public and stakeholder consultations.103 The composition of the Task
Force included representatives of municipal and regional municipalities, five industry
representatives, including two developers and one from the aggregate industry, and five NGOs,
of which four represented environmental organizations. Public meetings were held across the
greenbelt planning area and in August 2004 the Greenbelt Task Force produced a
recommendations report104 from which provincial inter-ministerial teams then developed a draft
greenbelt plan,105 which was approval in February 2005.106 Similar to the ORM conservation
legislation, Section 24 of the Greenbelt Act specifies “transitional” clauses specifying the start
date of greenbelt legislation as 16 December 2004; development applications approved prior to
that date, including approved transitional applications on the ORM, would be permitted to
proceed.107
But the greenbelt legislation also differs in important ways from the ORM legislation. For
one, ORM legislation was fueled by resistance, over a long period of time (at least a decade),
from homeowner groups, environmental groups, and diverse other actors.108 Legislation was to a
large extent the coming together of long-standing land use conflict and a specific moment of
electoral politics, where the Conservative government felt compelled to resolve this land dispute
in order to maintain the support of its broad constituency. 109 The Conservatives, under Mike
Harris, took action on the ORM not necessarily because they prioritized environmental
protection, but rather because they were under political pressure to do so by their constituency,
which included many homeowner activists on the moraine, especially wealthy owners of large
estate lots.110 Ideologically, the Harris government was opposed to government “interference” in
business, including the land development business.111 Roger Keil argues that Harris’s land use
policies both retreated from environmental regulations enacted by previous governments, and
reworked environmental regulations to favour privileged groups, such as home owners and land
developers. 112 The action the Harris government took in 2001 to protect the ORM must be
understood within a specific neoliberal institutional setting. It took action to protect the
103
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environment in order to protect its conservative electoral base, which was calling for protection
of the moraine. But it certainly was not going to abandon its corporate allies—land developers—
and ensured that some of them were ultimately protected (and compensated through the land
exchange) for loss of what developers perceived as their development rights. The process of
developing legislation was characterized by negotiation and compromise, where the provincial
government sought to appease the interests of environmental groups, homeowners, and
developers by inviting them to work together on the ORM advisory panel.
On the other hand, the McGuinty Liberal government seemed to have little incentive to
appease developers during enactment of greenbelt legislation, even though many developers
supported the Liberal party through campaign contributions and other forms of fundraising.
David Pond suggests that provincial governments in Canada are particularly inclined towards
land use based activism, given their responsibility for land use regulation.113 According to Pond,
although this activism is common across all political parties, the form it takes can vary
extensively. Activism also has both historical and future-oriented dimensions. As third-phase
institutionalists note, political actors must confront existing rules and norms, and evaluate to
what extent they can navigate these legacies as they try to assert their own agendas. 114 The
McGuinty government, at least in its first mandate, positioned itself in direct opposition to the
Conservatives. Primarily under Mike Harris, the Conservative government, from 1995 to 2003,
carried out its “Common Sense Revolution” 115 that, among other things, reduced funding to
environmental programs and agencies;116 restructured the land use planning system in Ontario by
reforming the OMB in favour of developers;117 and “streamlined” the development process by
reducing “delays” and the scope of development applications. 118 While the McGuinty
113
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government inherited this “streamlined” land use planning regime, it signalled its own agenda
early in its campaign by announcing that it would not only halt further development on the
ORM, but would also create a massive regional greenbelt in order to stop sprawl and preserve
agricultural land in the Toronto region. 119 The McGuinty government embraced growth
management and a highly interventionist environmental agenda of land use regulation, an agenda
that angered many landowners. 120 This signaled a change in institutional culture where
developers were no longer as privileged a social group as they had been under the Harris
government.
The McGuinty government did encounter resistance from one development group 121
during enactment of greenbelt legislation, which provides an illustrative comparison to the
Seaton land exchange by the Harris government. This development group, led by notable
Toronto region developer Silvio DeGasperis, owned land in part of an agricultural preserve
called the Duffins Rouge Agricultural Preserve (DRAP), an approximately 1900 hectare triangle
of land located just west of the Seaton lands in Pickering (see Figure 4; note the DRAP is
referred to on the map as Agricultural Assembly). DeGasperis and other landowners on the
DRAP (collectively known as the West Duffins Landowner Group) had been working with the
City of Pickering to carry out a Growth Management Study (GMS) beginning in 2002; the study
recommended development of approximately 400 hectares of the DRAP lands, near the village
of Cherrywood (Figure 4, Figure 5), that were owned by DeGasperis. 122 The GMS also
designated much of the Seaton lands as “natural heritage system” (Figure 5), even though by
2001 the province has signaled its intentions to exchange the Seaton lands and approve them for
urban development.
While the City of Pickering ultimately acknowledged the provincial plan to develop
Seaton and preserve the DRAP as agricultural land and part of the Greenbelt, the West Duffins
Landowner Group insisted that the Cherrywood Lands be removed from the Greenbelt.
DeGasperis' firm, Duffins Capital Corp, a member of the West Duffins Landowner Group, made
a presentation 1 February 2005 to standing committee at the provincial legislature debating the

planning decisions to the OMB; and reduced the time permitted by planning authorities to make decisions on
development or rezoning proposals. The Harris government also formulated a new Provincial Policy Statement that
reduced municipal requirements for affordable housing, schools, parks, and hospitals when planning new
developments, and also allowed for less stringent regulations on building near sensitive environmental features;
Pond, “Rules of the Game,” supra note 117 at 21.
119
John Barber, “Liberal promise could lift cloud over moraine,” The Globe and Mail (26 November 2002) A21,
online
<theglobeandmail.com/news/national/liberal-promise-could-lift-cloud-over-moraine/article758173/>
[perma.cc/QR9E-MP8Z].
120
For example, the president of the Greater Toronto Home Builders’ Association penned an article in the Toronto
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Valela, “Proposed planning reforms will hurt affordability,” Toronto Star (29 November 2003) M4.
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these groups is Silvio DeGasperis, a principal of TACC Construction.
122
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Figure 4. Study area of the City of Pickering Growth Management Study.123

123

Map adapted from City of Pickering, Growth Management Study Area Boundary as Per Council Resolution
#29/02 (Pickering: City of Pickering Planning and Development Department, 2002).
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Figure 5. Recommended plan of the City of Pickering Growth Management Study.124

124

Map adapted from Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Central Pickering Development Plan (Toronto:
Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2006) at 15.
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Greenbelt Act.125 Its argument was that development on the DRAP, instead of Seaton, would
better protect the environment and the cultural heritage of Pickering; that agricultural
opportunities were greater in Seaton than in the DRAP; that the DRAP lands were more readily
serviced (water, sewer, electricity, roads) since they were closer to the existing urban area; and
that the agricultural capabilities of parts of the DRAP were quite limited. When this argument
failed to convince the McGuinty government, DeGasperis, through the companies Hollinger
Farms No. 1 Inc. and Altona Farms Inc., filed a lawsuit against the provincial government,
specifically the Minister of Environment and the Ontario Realty Corporation, claiming that the
government did not carry out a proper environmental assessment for the Seaton lands.126 The
court dismissed the case, stating that the landowner group filed the lawsuit in order to “frustrate,
disrupt and delay the [Seaton] land exchange as a further step in their ongoing war with the
Province in their attempts to harass and intimidate the Province into permitting development on
their lands adjoining the Seaton Lands.” 127 This war was described in a Toronto Star article
explaining how DeGasperis was resisting McGuinty's greenbelt; “Pushing back is a polite way of
characterizing the war he's been waging against the province since the fall of 2004, when Dalton
McGuinty's Liberals slapped the greenbelt on 400 hectares of Pickering farmland DeGasperis
wants to turn into more subdivisions.”128 But McGuinty paid little attention to DeGasperis or the
many other landowners who perceived that their property rights had diminished with greenbelt
legislation. In one notable letter to the editor in the Toronto Star, a landowner states his
frustration with the McGuinty government, suggesting that even the very wealthy were not able
to defend their property rights:
The end of the rights of the private-property owner is in sight when a developer with
deep pockets cannot assert his property rights by spending $5 million. What is a mere
mortal to do? The province's greenbelt legislation, which took away Silvio
DeGasperis’s [principle of Hollinger Farms] rights on his property, mine and
thousands of other homeowners right across the province, amounts to expropriation
without compensation. … Every time I see those green signs on the highway,
‘Entering Ontario's Greenbelt,’ I feel sick. Where did they get the greenbelt? They
stole it from private landowners.129
Despite these claims, the McGuinty government proceeded with greenbelt legislation, and
provided no compensation to appease landowners, 130 although some developments, such as
125
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lands; MMAH, Land Exchange, supra note 71 at 2.
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quarries, highways, and infrastructure were permitted to continue, 131 and the Greenbelt Plan
includes mechanisms through which municipal councils of towns, villages, and hamlets can
apply for “modest” urban boundary extensions. 132 Similar to the ORM disputes, 133 many
landowners claimed to have suffered “expropriation without compensation” (or de facto
expropriation), even though not land was expropriated, and for the most part, land was not downzoned, but rather existing zoning was frozen to conform to new land use categories, such as
settlement, agricultural, and natural areas.134 When Hollinger Farms filed a lawsuit against the
McGuinty government, McGuinty did not back down or resort to compromise the way the Harris
government had done during the Seaton land exchange process. Hollinger Farms ended up losing
in court, and the McGuinty government, as do all provincial governments in Canada,135 was able
assert its authority to regulate land use. The McGuinty government used its authority to freeze
the zoning of land without requiring compensation, since the existing use of land was not
changed, and in so doing treated all landowners in a similar manner. The Harris government
preferred instead to grant four large developers rights through a land exchange, and to formulate
complex transitional clauses to permit select developers to develop land in a manner that was not
available to other landholders.

III. CONCLUSION: PROPERTY AND POLITICS IN THE
TORONTO REGION
Through a comparison of ORM Conservation legislation (enacted by the Conservatives under
Mike Harris) and Greenbelt legislation (enacted by the Liberals under Dalton McGuinty) this
article has illustrated that land use legislation affecting private property rights can serve political
agendas and navigate practical solutions to land use conflicts. While both the ORM and
Greenbelt legislation involved regional planning at the provincial level and significant loss of
developers’ ability to apply to develop their land, the processes leading to these statutes were
very different. ORM Conservation legislation was the result of years of opposition by many
actors and interests to land development on the ORM. It also involved extensive stakeholder and
public consultation in order to resolve long-standing conflict between developers, homeowner
groups, environmental activists, and municipal government representatives. Some developers
were able to negotiate a settlement that allowed them to continue to develop their ORM lands,
and they were also the beneficiaries of a land exchange that provided them with developable land
off the ORM. This article has shown that the process of developing the greenbelt, on the other
131
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hand, was relatively quick, involved little negotiation with landowners and included no
compensatory measures.
The political conditions under which these two statutes were enacted were influential to
the ultimate form these statutes took, but not explained by existing urban and planning theories
of land use development. This joining up of politics and property rights is absent in much urban
studies scholarship that sees governance in a context of rules and decisions that structure
relations of power, as well as urban form, very strongly.136 In Canada, these rules and structures
can be described as a “Westminsterian” parliamentary government, named after the British
system from which it was derived: provinces are responsible for land use regulation;
municipalities are granted their authority from the provinces; and property rights are not
explicitly protected constitutionally in Canada. 137 However, as Pond notes, these rules and
structures are not fixed, nor the outcomes of land use disputes always predictable: “Public
policies and the instruments relied upon to deliver them reflect the institutional frameworks
within which policy is developed as well as the influence of the political and economic interests
clustering around government.”138 Policy is not simply a reflection of an institutional framework
detached from actors and external influence. Political and economic interests are deeply
influential to the formulation and enactment of statutes. The Harris government had to navigate
political and economic interests when enacting the ORM legislation. On the other hand, the
McGuinty government was committed to developing a greenbelt and used its authority to bypass
certain political and economic interests. This is possible because private property rights can be
interpreted, and even changed, through legislation, in ways that enable particular government
agendas. In this context, private property rights can be strategically changed by government
actors, who, as third-phase institutionalists 139 phrase it, exercise strategic political agency to
change institutions, in this case institutions and cultures related to regional land use planning in
southern Ontario. Furthermore, legislative power can be used selectively. Canadian provinces
have the authority to legislate land use without compensating owners.140 However, the provinces
do not always use this power: they act strategically to balance support and opposition. 141
According to Pond, provincial authorities exercise their power strategically for a variety of
political and practical reasons:
the province has to be selective about the occasions and extent to which it intervenes
in local land-use issues. It cannot afford to run down its political capital
indiscriminately with excessive engagements in the messy realities of municipal
economic development, even when this might appear necessary to forestall policy
drift and uphold system-wide planning goals. Every such intervention in the name of
coherent growth management creates a new client of the provincial state with a
vested interest in further involvement, while potentially alienating influential
136
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members of the local growth coalition affected142
The local growth coalition seems to have been an important factor in preventing the Harris
government from exercising its legislative power over land use more strongly. Gabriel Eidelman
notes that the “growth machine” model of land-use planning was alive and well in Ontario in the
early 2000s, with the Conservative government in full support of the economic investment, tax
revenues, and electoral support that comes from land development.143 Influential corporate elites
also support politicians and parties more directly. Canadian political scientist Robert McDermid
has documented the financial contributions developers and the development industry have made
to provincial parties, politicians, and election candidates, and to municipal election candidates in
Ontario. 144 It is likely that this political and economic context played a part in four large
developers being compensated for harm due to government regulation absent any legal
requirement compelling the Harris government to compensate them at all.
But respect for some developers and their private property rights on the ORM was not
simply a matter of the Harris government making deals with its “developer friends,” as many
suggested to me in interviews.145 Neither did the Seaton land exchange serve to reinforce the
property rights of the exchange developers, even though it did ultimately give them rights to
develop land elsewhere. For one, the idea for the land exchange did not originate with
developers. Indeed two developers told me they were initially opposed to a land exchange, as
they were used to (and preferred) developing in Richmond Hill rather than Pickering.146 The land
exchange represented a complication for developers rather than a simple transfer of development
rights. Developers are centrally concerned about risk and delays; the land exchange increased
both. The land exchange also created uncertainty for the developers planning to develop their
property on the ORM in Richmond Hill. This crisis, from the standpoint of developers, derived
from the particular confluence of long-standing environmental activism and opposition to
development; the need for the Harris government to resolve a land-based problem quickly in
order to maintain public support; and the ultimate recognition by the moraine developers, who
had been traditional allies of Conservative provincial governments, that in this case they would
not be able to develop all of their moraine lands—a land exchange was not ideal but was better
than nothing. Historical institutionalists stress the importance of path dependent processes,
arguing that past decisions and events influence the course of subsequent events.147 Years of
activism opposing development on the ORM, the existing relationship with developers and
politicians, and the structural element of fixed election cycles must be seen as part of the history
leading up to the ORM legislation. But, as is emphasized by third-phase institutionalists, political
actors confront constraints, rules, and norms creatively, strategically evaluating which how
142
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power can be mobilized to achieve desired ends. 148 The Harris government acted very
strategically, including developers on the ORM advisory panel and making special deals with the
largest and most powerful developers, a move that also appeased some of the environmental
activists on the ORM advisory panel. Although critics of the land exchange suggest that
developers “got all they deserved and more,”149 this is not entirely accurate. Developers were not
clear winners on the ORM. Many had their lands entirely frozen, preventing further
development, and those that received land in Pickering have not yet begun development (as of
April 2017).
Conversely, greenbelt legislation was not simply the result of the McGuinty government
exercising its executive power over private property rights in the name of the public interest (or
to fulfill an election promise). Even though the greenbelt created uncertainty for many
landowners, developers and other land interests were not clear losers at the wrong end of a strong
provincial power over land use and property. Many firms’ landholdings adjacent to the greenbelt
increased significantly in value after the greenbelt legislation was enacted.150 Many developers I
interviewed consider this increase in value to be a direct result of the legislation, as the greenbelt
created a perceived shortage in developable land in the Toronto region, especially long term land
that many developers attempt to bank years ahead of development. In this sense, the greenbelt
indeed influenced the property rights of developers, but it did so in a way that made their land
more valuable, not less. Furthermore, although development of housing on greenbelt lands is
more difficult as a result of greenbelt legislation, many other types of activities, such as soil
dumps, airports, and wind turbines have been permitted to continue.151
The example of land use conflict in the Toronto region, and the intersections of these
conflicts with political agendas and the adjudication of property rights illustrate the politics of
property rights in Canada. Institutionalist theorists remind us that governance, including legal
processes governing land use, is deeply shaped by history, local cultures, actors, and ideas.152
Legal and governance processes are also sites of political and strategic action. 153 This is
especially the case in Canadian land use planning, where land-based property disputes are often
shifted away from the courts, negotiated instead through local disputes, local political dealmaking, and the mobilization of civil society actors and agencies.154 The trajectories of land use
conflict and resolutions are often difficult to predict, as illustrated by the very different
148
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procedures and outcomes surrounding the ORM conflicts versus development of a greenbelt in
the Toronto region. In other words, the precise outcomes of private property disputes rely heavily
on the local place-based actors, political contexts, and pre-existing relationships between state
and non-state actors.
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